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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether you are a small start-up business taking out your first loan or a
large and sophisticated commercial borrower looking to engage in a complex
transaction, you can generally expect to be required to post a certain level of
security to the lender for their loans.' While many lenders may be more willing
to advance unsecured funds to borrowers who have valuable assets and large
amounts of liquid capital than to a start-up company with few assets and little to
no profits, most borrowers will nonetheless be required to provide some level of
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Association for Law, Property, and Society, and the Author thanks all conference participants for
their helpful suggestions and comments, specifically Professors J.H.M. van Erp (Maastricht
University), Marie-Eve Arbor (Universit6 Laval), and Alexandra Harrington (Albany). The Author
also thanks McHenry Lee II, Carli Beckett, Randy P. Roussel, Brad Bourgeois, and Professors
Andrea B. Carroll (LSU), Melissa T. Lonegrass (LSU), and Sally Brown Richardson (Tulane) for
their helpful advice and invaluable support. All views and any errors herein are solely attributable
to the Author.
1. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 1-2 (8th ed. 2011).
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collateral to secure their borrowed funds.2  The prudent lender wants to reduce
the risk that the borrower will default and fail to repay the loan.3 In the event the
borrower defaults, the lender wants to know that something of value-preferably
equal to or greater than the value of the loan itself-can be quickly converted
into cash to satisfy the debt.4 Thus, the availability of credit and the borrower's
5ability to post collateral have gone hand in hand since lending's earliest origins.
In the financing world, what you get depends in large part on what you can give.
As the history of secured financing goes, the most traditional form of
collateral was real property.6 Borrowers would receive funds and, in exchange,
grant a security interest in their land. This would typically come in the form of
a conventional mortgage. Alternatively, or along with the mortgage, some
2. See, e.g., id. at 1 (explaining that unsecured loans are most often obtained by large
publicly-traded companies on the basis of projected cash flow and creditworthiness); BENTON E.
GuP & JAMES W. KOLARI, COMMERCIAL BANKING: THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK 260-63 (3d ed.
2005) (discussing the use of collateral by lenders to reduce risk, especially with respect to small
businesses with lower creditworthiness).
3. See, e.g., SANDRA SCHNITZER STERN, STRUCTURING COMMERCIAL LOAN AGREEMENTS
5.01, at 5-3 to 5-4 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the use of negative covenants in loan agreements to
restrict borrowers' activities); Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge
Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 305, 306-08 (1999) (discussing the use
of negative pledge covenants as a tool of unsecured lenders to minimize the risk of borrower
default); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225, 235-36 (1992) (discussing the concern of lenders over the devaluation of existing debt
due to the issuance of a subsequent debt of equal or higher priority).
4. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 879 (1996) (describing how the use of
covenants can be as effective, if not more effective, than a security interest by preventing the
encumbrance of assets); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118 (1979) (examining ways to write debt
contracts that lessen the conflict between stockholders and bondholders created when management
attempts to maximize the value of the stockholders' equity claim to the detriment of bondholders).
5. See George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M.
L. REv. 363, 365 (1999) (chronicling the history of secured transactions); see also RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS TEACHING MATERIALS 48-49 (5th ed. 1993) (discussing
the history of pledging personal property in the form of chattel mortgages); H.F. JOLOWICZ &
BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 159, 298-303 (3d
ed. 1972) (examining the history of primitive, private secured obligations); Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35
STAN. L. REV. 175, 179 (1983) (distinguishing secured and unsecured creditors in terms of their
respective interest with regard to particular collateral); Roger J. Goebel, Reconstructing the Roman
Law of Real Security, 36 TUL. L. REV. 29, 32 (1961) (explaining the historical use of penalties as a
type of security for bailments).
6. See 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
§ 332 (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler, eds., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1853) ("[f he doth
not pay, then the land which is put in pledge upon condition for the payment of the money, is taken
from him for ever, and so dead to him upon condition,. . . [aind if he doth pay the money, then the
pledge is dead as to the tenant.").
7. See id.
8. See id; ROBERT M. LLOYD, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 11.03, at 456 (1988) (defining
mortgages on real property).
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lenders would require the borrower to grant a security interest in goods or other
personal property.9 This category of collateral could include anything from farm
equipment and cattle to cars, boats, and planes.10 These more "movable" types
of collateral were usually secured by a chattel mortgage and, in more recent
times, by a security interest pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC).1
But as time has progressed, business parties have become more sophisticated
in their transactions.' 2 Deals that before involved merely the lending of capital
and the repayment of principal plus interest, all secured by personal and real
property, have been surpassed by business imagination and innovation. 3  No
longer do individuals and business entities expect to make only cash profits from
their investments; they often expect to receive other forms of value as well. 14
9. See, e.g., 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.1, at
24-25 (1965) (noting the abandonment of the rule forbidding nonpossessory interests in personal
property).
10. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 579 (2d ed. 1987).
11. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 9-10.
12. See Christopher K. Odinet, Toward a Convention for the International Sale of Real
Property: Challenges, Commonalities, and Possibilities, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 841, 842 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Ken Belson & Jeff Z. Klein, Canadian Communications Firms Agree to Buy
Maple Leafs and Raptors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at D4 (reporting that large communications
firms are purchasing interests in professional sports teams for $1.2 billion); C.J. Hughes, The Tricky
Task of Renovating a Building Without Altering Its Landmark Insides, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011,
at B6 (reporting owners of historical Fifth Avenue buildings are investing in costly renovations in
order to attract retail tenants); Julie Satow, Study Clarifies the Energy Savings in Retrofitted
Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at B5 (discussing Deutsche Bank Americas Foundation study
of the potential energy savings of energy efficient retrofitted buildings); Julie Satow, Visions of a
Development Rising from the Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at B6 (reporting New York City's
proposal of creating a new neighborhood that would generate billions of dollars in revenue for the
city); Evelyn M. Rusli, Gym, Tan, Raise Venture Capital?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2011, 2:26 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/l/I 8/gym-tan-raise-venture-capital (discussing whether venture
capitalists should get a spray tan before making a pitch); Evelyn M. Rush, I.B.M to Buy
DemandTec for $440 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011, 9:43 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2011/12/08/ibm-buys-demandtec-for-440-million (reporting major American technology
company's purchase of web-based enterprise software company for $440 million); Evelyn M. Rusli
& Michael J. de la Merced, LivingSocial Set to Raise About $200 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2011, 6:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/livingsocial-set-to-raise-near-200-million
(reporting web site's goal to raise money as it enlarges its sales force and enters new markets);
Evelyn M. Rusli, Thoma Bravo Acquires Blue Coat Systems for $1.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2011, 8:33 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/thoma-bravo-acquires-blue-coat-systems-
for-1-3-billion (reporting investment group's agreement to purchase an enterprise security and
network software systems group for $1.3 billion); Vinod Sreeharsha, Accel Invests in Brazilian
Review and Search Site, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011, 3:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
comi/2011/12/01/accel-invests-in-brazilian-review-and-search-site (reporting internet search web
site's investment in consumer internet market from $500 million XI Venture Fund).
14. See, e.g., Gary Glancy, Commissioners to Discuss Economic Incentives, Sheriff Davis
Monday, BLUERIDGENOW.COM (Dec. 8, 2011, 10:58 PM), http://www.blueridgenow.com/article/
20111208/ARTICLES/l 11209802?Title-Commissioners-to-discuss-economic-incentives-Sheriff-Davis-
Monday- (reporting county board of commissioners' planned meeting to discuss a possible $3.75
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Specifically, individuals and entities make investments not only for a return of
profit but also for the receipt of valuable tax credits.15
The granting of tax credits to encourage individuals to engage in certain
activities is a classic hallmark of tax policy in the United States. Individuals
and companies with heavy tax liabilities can use tax credits to reduce the amount
million incentive package for a manufacturing company); Lauren Pack, Retail Developer Seek
Millions in Incentives from County, MIDDLETOWN JOURNAL, http://www.middletownjournal.com/
news/news/local/retail-developer-seek-millions-in-incentives-from-/nNR8F (last updated Dec. 8,
2011, 7:52 PM) (discussing retail developers who sought a $55 million tax incentive commitment
from county); Kirsten Valle Pittman & Tim Funk, In Scramble for New Jobs, States Bid Up
Incentives, KNOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 7, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/dec/
07/in-scramble-for-new-jobs-states-bid-up (discussing state incentive structures offered to companies
in an attempt to create new jobs); Emily Schettler, Developer Defends IRL Incentives, IOWA CITY
PRESS CITIZEN, Dec. 7, 2011, https://secure.pqarchiver.com/press citizen/ (archived article
available by subscription) (reporting city's use of tax increment financing to provide millions of
dollars of incentives and infrastructure for retailers); Scott Sloan, State Incentives Approved for
Expanding Companies, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.kentucky.
com/2011/12/10/1988019/state-incentives-approved-for.html (discussing a tax incentive program
approved by Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority for various companies); South
Carolina County Approves Incentive Package for Amazon Warehouse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9,
2011, 4:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/09/amazon-warehouse-spartanburg-county
nI 140145.html (reporting county council's decision to give an incentives package to a new
Amazon.com Inc. warehouse, which is expected to create hundreds ofjobs).
15. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 26 (2006) (proposing an efficient way to structure tax
incentives to encourage certain behavior); Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to
Motorfuel: Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 43, 43 (2008)
(discussing whether the IRS' three tax incentives for ethanol are economically and environmentally
effective); Kirk J. Stark & Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know About the Interstate Economic
Effects of State Tax Incentives?, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 133, 134 (2006) (describing the
economic effects of state tax incentives in light of a Supreme Court decision on unconstitutional tax
credit); Thomas Karier, Business Tax Incentives and Investment 1 (Jerome Levy Econs. Inst. & E.
Wash. Univ., Working Paper No. 103, 1994) (arguing tax incentives designed to encourage
investment do not result in higher investments, therefore alternatives to investment tax credits
should be utilized); Michael S. Knoll, International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives, and a New
Argument for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting Implicit Taxes 4 (Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch. Inst. of Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract 1259927 (describing tax sparing agreements as incentives for foreign investment
companies); Jacques Morisset & Nede Pirnia, How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct
Investment: A Review (World Bank & Int'l Fin. Corp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 2509,
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=632579 (reviewing literature
on how tax policy impacts Foreign Direct Investment, issues resulting from globalization, and
future research possibilities).
16. See, e.g., David T. Ellwood, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social
Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1063, 1063 (2000)
(discussing how alterations in the Earned Tax Income Tax Credit can incentivize some people to
work, marry, or cohabitate); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, On Public Policy Grounds, a Limited Tax
Credit for Child Support and Alimony, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 321, 321-22 (1994) (discussing how
alimony deduction provisions were enacted to allow payors sufficient funds to satisfy their tax
burdens after paying alimony).
[VOL. 64: 143146
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TESTING THE REACH OF UCC ARTICLE 9
they owe the government.' Moreover, tax credits have become even more
valuable as commercial lending and government policy have evolved to include
programs that heavily incentivize certain activities and industries. Tax credits
have become a way of not only reducing one's tax liability, but also a way to
make a profit.
An investor who loans money or invests in a project that qualifies for certain
tax credits can take those credits and use them for the investor's benefit or even
sell them on the market to a willing buyer.' 9 These investors and buyers use the
credits as relief from their high-tax-bracketed liabilities.2 0 The ability for highly
taxed groups to obtain relief, sometimes substantial, from their tax liabilities
makes the holder of tax credits a powerful economic player in the commercial
21marketplace.
Government policymakers know the value of tax credits and, in turn, have
created many different incentive programs whereby investors advance funds for
certain projects deemed to be for the public good.22  In return, the investors
receive valuable tax credits that can be traded and sold for a profit.23 Tax credit
programs in the United States are as varied and diverse as the American
commercial landscape itself.24 There are credits for purchasers of electric cars25
and hybrid vehicles,26 producers of clean fuels,27 new enhanced oil recover
projects,28 oil and gas from marginal wells,29 refiners of low sulfur diesel fuel
and fuel from nonconventional sources,3 ' inventors of energy-efficient
appliances,32 energy-producing equipment, and technology to produce
17. See Stark & Wilson, supra note 15, at 137-38.
18. See, e.g., Batchelder et al., supra note 15, at 24 (arguing that a uniform refundable tax
credit encourages socially valued behavior).
19. See Karier, supra note 15, at 19-20.
20. See Batchelder et al., supra note 15, at 33 n.36.
21. See Karier, supra note 15, at 19-20.
22. See, e.g., Miki Malul & Israel Luski, The Optimal Policy Combination of the Minimum
Wage and the Earned Income Tax Credit, 9 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 1-3 (2009)
(discussing the impact the Earned Income Tax Credit and minimum wage have on human capital
acquisition); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tar Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 405, 408 (1997) (arguing the Earned Income Tax Credit is a
better tool than the minimum wage for reaching the government objective of progressive wealth
distribution).
23. See Batchelder et al., supra note 15, at 33 n.36.
24. See generally I.R.C. §§ 30-48 (2006) (federal statute providing tax credits).
25. Id § 30.
26. Id § 30B.
27. Id § 30C.
28. Id §43.
29. Id § 451.
30. Id § 45H.
31. Id. §45K.
32. Id § 45M.
33. Id § 48.
2012] 147
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electricity and synthetic gases from coal,34 biomass,3 5 and petroleum residue,
as well as for investors in low-income housing" and projects in low-income
communities. Whatever may be the government policy de jour, one can expect
to see a tax credit produced to help push that policy along by giving an incentive
to investors to choose to put their money in this project, as opposed to another.3 9
And as long as individuals and businesses are looking for ways to reduce their
tax burden, tax credits will become only more valuable.40 With legislative
bodies at both the state and local levels continuously producing large quantities
of tax credits to further their policies, the cash-flushed investor has a myriad of
options to choose from when determining which project is worth the investment
(and which will produce the most credits).4 1
Lenders are also wise to the rush by individuals and corporations toward tax
credit investments.42 An investor might borrow money from a financial
institution in order to make an investment in a certain business that intends to
undertake a project qualifying for substantial tax credits.4 3 The business will
receive profits from the success of the project and, in turn, will transfer the tax
credits it receives to the investor as repayment.44 Traditionally, the financial
institution would require that the typical collateral be posted to secure the loan.45
This could include the investor's real property, goods and equipment, and
deposit accounts and accounts receivable, to name a few. 46 However, as lenders
have become aware that the true value in the hands of the investor and his
business partners is the tax credit, the sufficiency of more traditional forms of
34. Id § 48A.
35. Id § 48B(4).
36. Id. § 48B(8).
37. Id. § 42.
38. Id. § 45D.
39. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1997) (theorizing that governmental policy
objectives drive population targeted tax credits); C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX
POLICY 126-28 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing how the 1986 Tax Reform Act was used to reward
innovation and incentivize the investment in productive assets).
40. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 39, at 3, 34 (noting that the number of tax loopholes with
social welfare objectives have nearly quadrupled in the last three decades); STEUERLE, supra note
39, at 34-35 (noting that, based on four decades of data, policy-driven tax expenditures have grown
rapidly).
41. See HOWARD, supra note 39, at 25-26.
42. See, e.g., Vanessa Houlder et al., Tax Wars: A Fight Worth Billions, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25,
2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b2lb5leO-e524-l leO-bdb8-00144feabdcO.html#axzz24aPJFptL
(discussing the legal disputes among the IRS, American banks, and Barclays regarding foreign tax
credits).
43. See, e.g., Noah S. Baer, Energy Investment Partnerships and the Allocation of the
Sections 29 and 45 Energy Tax Credits, 101 J. TAx'N 364, 366-67 (2004) (discussing how § 29
enables tax credits to flow to investors and § 45 encourages funding from investors).
44. See Baer, supra note 43, at 365-66.
45. See GUP & KOLARI, supra note 2, at 260.
46. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 12.
[VOL. 64: 143148
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TESTING THE REACH OF UCC ARTICLE 9
collateral has been called into question.47 More and more lenders want a security
interest in actual tax credits as a way to secure the loan.48 While traditional
forms of collateral may, if foreclosed upon, help make the lender whole, the
potential proceeds from the sale of the tax credits can serve as a considerable
supplement to this security.49 In determining the level of collateral required to
advance the funds, the prudent lender will assess the entirety of the borrower's
assets and revenues.50 The substantial economic value of tax credits produced
from certain investments is ripe for the picking in terms of providing the lender
with the security that it needs to substantiate the lending of funds.' Moreover,
some borrowers-who might not necessarily have the requisite level of
traditional collateral to entice a lending institution to advance funds-can use the
allure of a tax credit allocation to persuade lenders that tax credit collateral will
52more than secure the loan and provide protections to reduce the lender's risk.
While tax credit financing may be all the rage in the world of secured
transactions, there remains an undercurrent of uncertainty regarding its legal
efficacy. The exotic and economically profitable nature of the tax credit as
collateral is what makes it both attractive to lenders but also uncertain to
lawyers. Tax credits do not fit neatly into the traditional categories of collateral
under Article 9 of the UCC. Although they may seem to fit into the UCC's
category of "general intangibles" because of their amorphous and unique
qualities, courts have struggled with how to properly label and deal with these
rights.53 For instance, general intangibles have been held to include copyrights,
patents, trademarks, and intellectual property.54 However, whether tax credits
47. For an example of the shift by lenders to require more unconventional forms of collateral,
such as intellectual property rights, see Claire Philpott & Susan Jahnke, Intellectual Property: A
New Form of Collateral, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Mar. 6, 2005, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.
com/seattle/stories/2005/03/07/focus9.html.
48. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 43, at 366-67 (discussing an investor's interest in obtaining
tax credits).
49. See generally GUP & KOLARI, supra note 2, at 260-63 (discussing traditional types of
collateral).
50. See, e.g., GUP & KOLARI, supra note 2, at 260-63 (discussing the types of collateral
banks use to reduce their risk when making a loan); THOMAS J. PINKOWISH, RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE LENDING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 385, 395-97 (Dave Shaut ed., 6th ed. 2012)
(directing residential mortgage loan officers to consider assets, collateral, and any other
compensating factors when evaluating a loan applicant).
51. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 43, at 366-67 (noting that tax credit collateral can offset risk
and result in a more attractive investment opportunity); Lisa Bennett, Are Tradable Carbon
Emissions Credit Investments? Characterization and Ramifications Under International Investment
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1581, 1597-98 (2010) (arguing that tax credits are a form of intangible
property investments).
52. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 43, at 366-67 (noting that the transfer of § 45 tax credits
entices project investments).
53. See infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
54. See Lars S. Smith, General Intangible or Commercial Tort: Moral Rights and State-
Based Intellectual Property as Collateral Under U C. C. Revised Article 9, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV.
J. 95, 96 (2005).
2012] 149
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fall precisely into this category has yet to be determined. Some courts have
avoided making an affirmative determination; others have engaged in confusing
legal acrobatics to affirm them; and, in some cases, courts have denied their use
as collateral at all. Moreover, cases on the issue are incredibly sparse. Despite
the fact that more security agreements are being drafted to include tax credits as
a part of the collateral in these types of transactions, very little judicial guidance
exists in the way of tax credit financing.55 In substantial transactions where a
great deal of capital is at stake and a large portion of the security is bound up in
tax credit allocations, the prospect of a court invalidating the security should
give more than just a moment's pause to lawyers and businesspersons alike. Tax
credit financing is an emerging trend in today's business world, but how solid is
its foundation?
This Article attempts to lay that foundation by analyzing the theoretical
underpinnings of the UCC's category for general intangibles and showing how
classification as a general intangible can, and should, comport with the legal
substance of tax credits as a form of secured financing. Part II investigates the
theory and nature that form the basis of tax credits and their economic value, as
well as provides some background and analysis of the UCC's collateral category
for general intangibles. Part III gives an overview of the relatively meager case
law on tax credit financing and explains how courts have struggled with this new
concept. The Part highlights the courts' nonuniform and often times inaccurate
analyses and points out that courts are focusing on the wrong feature of tax
credits to support their holdings. Part IV calls for courts to jettison their current
focus on refundability in analyzing tax credit collateral cases and to adopt a new
judicial test that calls for assessing the substantive and procedural transferability
of tax credits, thereby giving courts a new and more appropriate framework to
employ when approaching cases involving tax credits and secured transactions.
This Article concludes that tax credits should be treated as permissible collateral
under Article 9 in certain circumstances when the credits comport with a test for
substantive and procedural transferability and, further, that courts can use this
new two-prong test for transferability when confronted with other types of
emerging and nontraditional general intangible collateral.
II. UNDERSTANDING TAx CREDITS AND UCC ARTICLE 9
In trying to resolve the question of how courts should deal with security
interests in tax credits granted under Article 9 of the UCC, one must first
understand the fundamentals of both Article 9 and tax credits themselves. To the
extent the tax credit device fits into the overall scheme, Article 9 requires
delving into the nature, purpose, and history of both.
55. See infra Part III and accompanying discussion.
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A. Exploring the Nature of Tax Credits
56Tax credits are a public policy function of the overall tax system. In
general, the income tax system is meant to form a basis from which the
government can derive function for activities related to the public good. A
portion of a person or entity's income is taxed, and the government then
58allocates the proceeds from this tax for public purposes. The taxpayer's ability
to direct and influence the expenditure of tax revenue is limited to the political
process. 59 Stated another way, it is by and large the government itself that
directs the funds into various projects and for various purposes, while the
taxpayer plays only a supporting role.60 However, the tax credit can be viewed
as the opposite of this dichotomy.61 Here, it is the individual who chooses where
to direct his funds, investing in those projects that he deems to be most
productive, and the government plays the secondary role by providing tax
62
incentives to the individual for investing in those projects. The individual
controls the choice of expenditure, and the government provides the support
through tax relief. 63
Over time, Congress has created and reauthorized tax credits for a wide
array of economic and social purposes.64 Because of the immensely varied
special interests that lobby and impact the decisions of Congress, the number and
variety of tax credits are wide-ranging and exceedingly diverse.65 Each credit is
designed to influence the taxpayer's decisionmaking in one way or another.66
Credits encourage the individual either to engage in certain activities for which
he will be rewarded or to shy away from certain activities which will not yield
tax benefits.6 7
The mechanics of how these benefits work are simple. After a taxpayer
determines his gross income for a given calendar year, he deducts from this
number whatever amounts to which he is entitled for certain legislatively-created
deductions, then multiplies the remaining amount by the applicable rate table for
68 69that year. This number will produce the taxpayer's tentative tax liability.
The taxpayer will then subtract whatever tax credits he is entitled to receive from
56. See SANFORD M. GUERIN & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 879 (6th ed. 2002).
57. See id. at 1.
58. See id. at 1-3.
59. See id
60. See id
61. See id. at 879.
62. See id
63. See id
64. Id
65. Seeid at879-83.
66. See id
67. Id.
68. SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 37, 37 (2005).
69. Id
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his tentative liability.70 Whatever amount remains after all tax credits have been
subtracted from the tentative tax liability is the individual's final tax liability to
71the government.
Taxpayers prefer tax credits to tax deductions.72 While the deduction is also
used for social and economic policy purposes (i.e., to encourage or discourage
certain activity), the tax credit, as a general matter, has vastly more worth.
Deductions have a much weaker impact on an individual's tax liability, and
scholars and policymakers have argued that they disproportionately benefit the
wealthy. 74 The tax credits' value is, in part, what makes them such attractive
candidates for collateral in secured transactions.75 Specifically, credits reduce
the tax liability on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 7 6 If one has $15,000 in tentative tax
liability, and $10,000 in tax credits, then the final tax liability is $5,000.7
However, with deductions, the value is captured on the front end before the
marginal rate is applied. Some scholars have described the tax deduction as
"regressive" in that its value is dependent on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate and
the actual amount of the deduction.7 9 Tax credits, however, because they reduce
one's tax liability dollar-for-dollar regardless of income level, are more
evenhanded. 0
A particularly valuable aspect of tax credits is that they are sometimes
refundable. As a general notion, the value of the credit depends on the amount
of one's tax liability.8 1 If the tax credit is greater than the tax liability, then the
tax liability is zeroed out and the remaining unused credits are seemingly
worthless. However, Congress often provides for certain credits to be refundable
or carried over for use in the next tax year. 82 other words, once the tax
liability has been reduced to zero, any remaining credits can either be returned to
the taxpayer by the government in the form of a cash refund or claimed to reduce
the taxpayer's liability in the following year.83 In the case of refundable credits,
since the credits can come in the form of cash payments, their value does not
necessarily depend upon an available tax liability. Thus, credits themselves have
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 56, at 879-80.
73. Id
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id at 879.
77. See id. at 879-80.
78. Id.
79. Id at 880.
80. See id. at 879-80.
81. See id. at 879.
82. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 925 (14th
ed. 2006); see also I.R.C. §§ 31-37 (2006) (subpart of Internal Revenue Code relating to refundable
credits).
83. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 82, at 925.
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an independent value, separate and apart from the particular qualities of the
holder.
In broad terms, tax credits exist for everything from homeownership,
education, retirement plans, and healthcare expenses, to charitable giving, life
insurance policies, municipal bond investments, and labor. For example, a
historically popular credit for investors was the Low-Income Housing Credit,
which provided tax credits for investment in housing for depressed areas and
low-income individuals.86  The research credit also provides an attractive
opportunity for investors to take advantage of a substantial tax credit for research
and experiment related expenditures. With the advent of the sustainability
movement, more and more tax credits are now Peared toward incentivizing
investments in green and renewable resources. One such credit is for
individuals who make energy-efficient improvements to their homes, such as
installing solar panels or biofuel cells.89 As the variety and value of tax credits
continue to grow, the economic strength of these intangible rights have come to
the forefront of the commercial and business scene.90
B. Combining Tax Credits and UCC Article 9
While both the value of tax credits and the creative ways in which investors
are taking advantage of government programs that yield them have increased, the
procedure for using tax credits as collateral for financing remains a separate
inquiry. Understanding the basics of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and how tax credits fit into the overall Article 9 structure is where the true issue
lies.
As a general matter, prior to the advent of Article 9, security in personal
property encompassed a myriad of different devices including chattel mortgages,
conditional sales, trust receipts, factors' liens, and assignments of accounts
receivable (each imperfect in its own way).9 I Each state had its own laws and
nuanced provisions pertaining to each of these devices, making them provincial
and nonuniform across the country.92  In the late 1940s, Professors Grant
Gilmore and Allison Dunham-the primary drafters of Article 9-began
constructing a unified system of secured financing in personal property that
84. GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 56, at 879-80.
85. See Batchelder et al., supra note 15, at 43.
86. See I BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 1 27.5.3, at S27-60 (Supp. No. 2 2012).
87. See id 27.4.1, at S27-30.
88. See id 27.6.1, at S27-67 to -68.
89. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 25C (2006) (credit for nonbusiness energy property); id. § 25D
(credits for maintaining energy efficient residential property).
90. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing tax credits as
intangible property investments).
91. WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 10.
92. Id.
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would completely displace the old patchwork system and create a single,
multipurpose statute that other states could adopt.93 The result was Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 94 The drafters of Article 9 did not intend to
eliminate the traditional security devices mentioned above, but rather, intended
to wipe away the differences between them.9 5 The old terms and labels could
still be used to describe security devices in personal property, but these age-old
devices now had to conform to the baseline requirements of Article 9 to be
effective. 96 The general rule found in section 9-109(a) of Article 9 provides,
"this Article applies to: (1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a
security interest in personal property."97 The comment to this section states, "the
principal test whether a transaction comes under this Article is: is the transaction
intended to have effect as security?"98  In this way, the local and traditional
trappings of certain security devices were preserved, while the true effectiveness
of the security, whatever its label, depended upon requirements that were
uniform across jurisdictions.
Article 9 relates to transactions involving the granting of security in personal
property as well as fixtures or component parts.10 Particularly significant in the
Article 9 process is the categorization of personal property into different types of
collateral.101 For instance, the rules that govern securities in an account
receivable are distinguishable from those involved in collateralizing a bus,
airplane, or truck.102 For the purposes of analyzing tax credit security, the
applicable collateral category is that of "general intangibles."o03 This categor
was added last in the list of Article 9 collateral classes as a catch-all provision.
Anything that does not fall under one of the other categories can, in most cases,
be classified as a general intangible.105 This includes things in action, such as
93. Id; GILMORE, supra note 9, § 9.1, at 288-89 & n.1.
94. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 10.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (2011).
98. ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 14 (5th
ed. 2000) (quoting U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 1 (1972)).
99. See LLOYD, supra note 8, § 1.03[F], at 8; WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 10.
100. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (2011).
101. LESTER E. DENONN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC 36 (Practising Law
Institute rev. ed. 1965); see also Terry M. Anderson et al., Attachment and Perfection of Security
Interests Under Revised Article 9: A "Nuts and Bolts" Primer, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179,
187-89 (2001) ("Whatever record the debtor adopts must contain a description of the
collateral. ... [S]uper-generic descriptions like 'all personal property' will not be sufficient for
security agreements.").
102. See DENONN, supra note 101, at 36-38; Kenneth C. Kettering, True Sale ofReceivables:
A Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 514-16 (2008).
103. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
104. See id § 9-102 cmt. 5(d); Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for
Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167, 170 (1999).
105. WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS
§ 1.04[c][2], at 35 (3d ed. 2004).
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patent rights, rights to royalties, and rights under certain types of performance
contracts. Section 9-102(a)(42) of Revised Article 9 states that .a general
intangible is:
any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts,
chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents,
goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of
credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The
term includes payment intangibles and software.' 07
The definition is broad, sweeping, and rather short. In essence, if personal
property does not fall into one of the other categories, then it is most likely a
general intangible. os It is often described as a residual category because of its
global effect. 09
However, according to section 9-102, an account is "a right to Payment of a
monetary obligation . . . (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased,
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, [and] (ii) for services rendered or to
be rendered."o Therefore, an account is always defined as a certain type of
right to demand payment, while a general intangible is a right to payment owed
for a reason other than the provision of goods and services or a right of
ownership in intangible property that does not involve payment."' Since the
definition of account is drawn broadly, one may wonder what exactly general
intangibles would cover and why tax credits would not be classified as accounts.
Courts have defined the following examples of personal property as general
intangibles: "patent rights, trademark rights, rights to tax refunds, rights to
refunds for overpayments to an employee pension plan, claims for breach of
contract, liquor licenses, FCC licenses," a refundable lease security deposit, a
beneficial interest in a land trust, rights under a cable television agreement, and
water permits.112 Sometimes courts arrive at the conclusion that property is a
106. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
107. Id. § 9-102(a)(42).
108. LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 105, § 1.04[c][2], at 35.
109. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
110. Id. § 9-102(a)(2).
111. See Anderson et al., supra note 101, at 183.
112. LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 105, at 35-36 (citing In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 23
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (patent rights); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l Acceptance
Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 207
(6th Cir. 1986) (trademarks); Sterling Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals
Int'l, Inc.), 20 B.R. 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rights to tax refund); In re Long Chevrolet, Inc., 79
B.R. 759 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (rights to overpayments into employee pension plan); Merchs.
Nat'1 Bank of Mobile v. Ching, 681 F.2d 1383 (1lth Cir. 1982) (breach of contract claims); Queen
of the N., Inc. v. LeGrue, 582 P.2d 144 (Alaska 1978) (liquor license); In re Ridgely Commc'ns,
Inc., 139 B.R. 374 (Bankr. Md. 1992) (Federal Communications Commission broadcasting license);
Lake Region Credit Union v. Crystal Pure Water, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 524 (N.D. 1993) (water
permits)); see also Bus. Bank v. White (In re Timonthy Dean Rest. & Bar), 342 B.R. 1, 11-14
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general intangible through unconventional means.11 3 For instance, in United
States v. Antenna Systems, Inc.,114 the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire held that drawings, plans, and other technical data
produced by engineers were general intangibles as opposed to goods because the
true value of the items was in the intellectual labor that went into creating them,
rather than the paper and ink used to write them down.' The court held that
supporting materials such as cost estimates, bid information, and proposals were
also within the general intangible category because the value of the concepts and
designs, not the actual documents, represented the true collateral to the
creditor.116
In general, lenders will seldom allow the only security for a loan to be
copyrights, trademarks, literary rights, and the like, when making a loan to a
borrower.117 These general intangibles, though valuable, do not represent the
kind of traditional collateral that lenders have come to solely rely upon when
advancing funds." However, many lenders will use general intangibles as a
kind of backup or supplementary security for the loan, while traditional collateral
such as machinery, goods, equipment, and accounts receivable serve as the
primary security.' 19 This is not to say that lenders have never looked to a general
intangible as the sole form of security. 12 0 Patent rights, for example, which
create a certain level of dominance in a given market, can be deemed sufficient.
This is because the patent-granting exclusivity over a market-produces great
value to the borrower. 121 Moreover, there is a recent trend in the entertainment
industry for producers and their companies to borrow money and secure the
funds with rights in the performance itself.122 If the show fails, the lender can
still seize the production materials and perhaps sell them to another performance
medium that can use the material to create a book, movie, or television
program.123 Thus, while not made whole, the lender can use the rights in the
show to recoup some of its losses.124 These lenders have often been termed
"Broadway angels" because of their expertise in determining which shows are
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (security deposit for restaurant lease); Elgin Nat'l Bank v. Cowsert (In re
Cowsert), 14 B.R. 340, 343 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (beneficial interest in land trust); James Cable
Partners, L.P. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re James Cable Partners, L.P.), 141 B.R. 772, 776-77 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1992) (cable television subscriptions).
113. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 105, § 1.04[c][2], at 36.
114. 251 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.H. 1966).
115. See id at 1015-16.
116. See id. at 1016.
117. LEONARD LAKIN & HOWARD J. BERGER, A GUIDE TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS 121-22
(1970).
118. See id
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id.
124. See id.
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likely to be successful-thus embodying general intangible rights which would
make reliable collateral for a loan.125 Similarly, publishers often advance money
to a successful writer to fund the writer's next work.126 The funds are then
secured by the literary rights of the writer, even before the writer has written the
first page.127 The publishing company uses its expertise to make a judgment
call-based on the writer's skill--on whether the work will be successful.128
The use of general intangibles is not, however, limited to the arts and
129literature. 1 A general contractor will often assign his rights to completed
performance payments to an insurance company in return for the company's
issuance of a payment and performance bond.
A major subcategory of general intangibles implicated in the discussion of
tax credit collateral is that of payment intangibles. 1 This subcategory is
defined in section 9-102(a)(61) as "a general intangible under which the account
debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation."l32 The key phrase in this
definition is "principal obligation."133  It could be said that practically all
obligations can involve the payment of money in some form or another, 34
However, merely because the payment of money is implicated in a particular
obligation does not mean that it rises to the level of a payment intangible. 3
Rather, the principal obligation of the debtor must be the payment of money.136
For instance, the right to bring suit under a tort or breach of contract claim can
be seen as involving the payment of money to the obligee if he or she is
successful on the merits; however, these rights are not payment intangibles
because the primary obligation does not involve a monetary performance. On
the other hand, Article 9 does not distinguish between principal and ancillary
obligations.' 3 8 Therefore, it is often up to courts to determine whether, based on
the facts and circumstances, an obligation is a payment intangible.139
It can be argued that tax credits, in certain circumstances, fall into the
payment intangible subcategory of general intangibles. If the credit is indeed
refundable, then the credit represents a right to receive payment from the
government.140 The government is the obligor, and it could be said that the
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (2011).
130. LAKIN & BERGER, supra note 117, at 122.
131. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 171.
132. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61).
133. See WARREN& WALT, supra note 1, at 171.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 171-72.
138. See id. at 170.
139. See id.
140. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 82, at 925.
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government's principal obligation to the taxpayer is a monetary one.141 The
government is obligated, once the taxpayer's tax liability has been reduced to
zero and excess credits remain, to pay the taxpayer in money.142 However, one
can also argue that the principal obligation requirement may not be met in many
cases, since the initial purpose of the credits is to reduce the taxpayer's tax
liability and the receipt of excess credits in the form of a refund is only an
ancillary purpose. 143 This argument is buttressed by the fact that credits must
first go to reduce tax liability before they can be used to create an actual
payment.144 However, the contrary argument is equally compelling. Whether
the value is in the reduction of liability or in the actual payment of money, the
obligation is monetary in nature. In each instance, the credit is giving some
benefit to the taxpayer through a pecuniary channel. In both cases the currency
or coinage of the government is being used, either directly or indirectly, to
benefit the monetary position of the taxpayer. Hence, the tax credit principally
involves a monetary obligation by the government to the taxpayer.
More broadly, even if tax credits do not always-or hardly ever-fit into the
payment intangible category, they arguably fit fairly well into the larger general
intangible category. As with all general intangibles, the personal property must
not fall within one of the other categories in order to qualify pursuant to the
definition.14 5 The most obvious contender is that of an account receivable.146
However, the account receivable represents the right to demand payment for
goods sold or leased or for services rendered, which is not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper. 147 The tax credit is not given for the selling or
leasing of goods or the rendering of services; 148 tax credits are generated through
the expenditure of capital, chiefly in certain investment areas.149 Nevertheless,
an argument can be made that, in an indirect way, some tax credits are generated
through the rendering of services or through the sale of goods. A New Markets
Tax Credit, which is generated by a qualified, active low-income business that
provides services to certain low-income communities, may tangentially represent
payment for the rendering of services.150  However, the actual rendering of
services is not what calls for the payment of credits. Rather, it is the investment
in the qualified, active low-income business that creates the credits.151  The
141. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(59) (2011) (defining "obligor" as one who "owes
payment or other performance" for the obligation secured by a security interest).
142. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 82, at 925.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2), (42).
146. See id.
147. See id. § 9-102(a)(2).
148. See id.; id. § 9-109(d)(4).
149. See generally I.R.C. §§ 38-45R (2006) (granting tax credits for certain business-related
investments).
150. See id. § 45D.
15 1. See id.
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qualifying business must render services to be eligible to receive the
investment.152 When carefully tracing the activity which actually produces the
credits directly, it is logical to conclude that the tax credits fall into the category
of general intangibles and, with certain credits, into the subcategory of payment
intangibles.
Despite the urgings stated above, whether tax credits fall, be it neatly or not,
into the category of general intangibles or any other Article 9 category has vexed
courts confronted with the issue. Although the basic concepts behind general
intangibles and payment intangibles appear to contemplate the tax credit
scenario, case law has not found the avenues easy to travel. 154 As explained in
greater detail below, the judicial analysis relative to these new forms of collateral
is in need of further refinement. 155
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TAX CREDIT SECURITY CASE LAW
Because the use of tax credits as collateral is new to business transactions,
there is very little case law dealing with the topic.156 This is likely due, in part,
to the fact that many of these tax credit-driven transactions have either
succeeded, in which case there has been no need to litigate or foreclose on the
security; or, in the alternative, the projects have failed, but either the lenders and
borrowers were able to reach a compromise or the lenders were able to foreclose
on more traditional forms of collateral to satisfy the debt. This lack of case law
does not bode well for future courts. With tax credits becoming so prevalent and
their use as security so widespread in tax credit-related transactions,"' it is likely
that courts will need to address waves of tax credit foreclosures. The lack of
established jurisprudence to provide an analytical framework for rendering
judicial decisions will make collateral liquidations difficult. However, in
looking to the current, albeit limited, case law and analysis of courts that have
dealt with tax credit financing, we are able to predict, in part, which issues courts
152. See id. § 45D(d)(2)(A).
153. Compare Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int'l, Inc.),
20 B.R. 633, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting the lack of authority on the classification of tax
refunds under Article 9, and concluding that such refunds are general intangibles), and In re
Richardson, 216 B.R. 206, 219 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (concluding that federal income tax credits
are general intangibles), with City of Chi. v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d 877, 885 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (noting that "no court has yet determined whether income tax credits constitute
general intangibles for purposes of Article 9," and concluding that income tax credits cannot be
considered intangible personal property).
154. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part III.
156. See Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 885 (noting that, as of 1993, "no court has
yet determined whether income tax credits constitute general intangibles for the purposes of Article
9").
157. See supra Part I; see also Batchelder et al., supra note 15, at 24 ("Each year the federal
individual income tax code pyovides over $500 billion worth of incentives intended to encourage
socially beneficial activities, such as charitable contributions, homeownership, and education.").
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may struggle with in making the ultimate determination as to the effectiveness of
the security. 58 Further, in reviewing the existing case law, we are able to see
how the current state of the law in the area of tax credit financing is ill-defined,
and therefore lacks an overarching analyical framework that future courts
dealing with the subject can use as a guide. 9
A. In re Metric Metals International, Inc.
The United States Bankruptcy Court was one of the first courts to address
the question of Article 9 tax-related financing in In re Metric Metals
International, Inc.160 In this case, the debtor agreed to execute an agreement
giving the bank a security interest in
all the Debtor's Receivables present and future, whether or not now or
hereafter specifically assigned or pledged ... whether now existing or
hereafter created; all proceeds of such Receivables in whatever form,
including cash, deposit accounts, negotiable instruments and other
instruments for the payment of money; . .. [and] all other accounts due
from Account Debtors to Debtor . 61
Further, the security agreement included a rider stating,
the collateral for the security interest includes but is not limited to
accounts and contract rights which . .. are created or otherwise arise out
of the sale of merchandise or the supplying of services . . . in the regular
course of [debtor's] business or otherwise. This includes any of the
foregoing classified under the Uniform Commercial Code as ... general
intangibles .... 162
When the debtor received a tax refund, both the trustee and the bank made
claims to the funds.163 The trustee argued that tax refunds did not constitute
accounts receivable as the term was defined in the security agreement because
the rights in question were "limited to those which are 'created or otherwise arise
out of the sale of merchandise or the supplying of services." 1 6 4 The trustee
further argued that the inclusion of general intangibles in the collateral
description failed to capture the tax refund because the security agreement
158. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
160. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int'l, Inc.), 20 B.R.
633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
161. Id at 634 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 635 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id at 636.
164. Id at 635.
160 [VOL. 64: 143
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss1/5
TESTING THE REACH OF UCC ARTICLE 9
contemplated only general intangibles that were related to the receivables arising
out of the sale of merchandise or the providing of services. 16 5 Based on this
narrow and limited reading of the security agreement, the trustee argued that the
tax refunds constituted a type of property that was not encumbered. 166In
contrast, the bank argued that such a restricted reading was incorrect.167 Among
other things, the bank contended that the security agreement's statements
regarding "all other accounts due from Account Debtors" extended the list of
eligible account debtors beyond those for the sale of merchandise or providing of
168services.
The court acknowledged that while there was little to no authority on
whether a tax refund constituted a general intangible under Article 9-a point
similarly noted by other courts addressing tax credit collateralization-
commentators and doctrine seemed to favor a broad reading of the collateral
category.169 Further, the court noted that an indirectly related Colorado appellate
case had concluded that money that was to be collected by a claimant in a
lawsuit was a general intangible.170 The bankruptcy court concluded that the tax
refund constituted a general intangible-in which a security interest was
properly perfected-and thus the bank had a superior claim to the funds.171
While the court did not specifically address tax credits, its analysis of tax
refunds is instructive. Like tax credits, tax refunds are rights against the
government to demand payment in connection with tax laws.172 With a tax
refund-also called a rebate-the taxpayer typically withholds and pays over to
the government a certain amount from his estimated taxes throughout the taxable
year, and when calculating his tax liability in light of all deductions, exclusions,
and credits, his overall liability is less than the amount actually withheld and
paid. 173 The overage comes back to the taxpayer in the form of a refund from the
government. 174 In other words, the government is returning to the taxpayer the
amount he paid in advance, but did not end up owing.175 Tax credits operate in a
165. Id
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 636 (citing In re Certified Packaging, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan & Co.)
95, 102 (Bankr. D. Utah 1970); P. COOGAN ET AL., 1 SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5A.09[1] (19-) [hereinafter COOGAN UNDATED]); see also Julian
B. McDonnell, Revised Article 9: A Complete Restatement of Personal Property Security
Transactions, in PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., 1 SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COM'MERCIAL CODE § 1A.04[4], at 1A-31 (2006) (citing U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (2001)).
170. See In re Metric Metals, 20 B.R. at 636 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Berkeley Vill.,
580 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Colo. App. 1978)).
171. See id at 636-38.
172. See MARVIN J. GARBIS ET AL., FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION: CIVIL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 17.01, at 17-2 to -3 (1985).
173. See id
174. See id. 20.04, at 20-11.
175. See id.
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somewhat similar manner. In return for making certain investments or for
satisfying certain conditions, the government grants a credit to the taxpayer that
can be used to offset his final tax liability. 17 7 In the case of refundable credits,
the government will actually remit any excess credits to the taxpayer in the form
of a refund once all liability has been extinguished. 78 Thus, the credit refund
and the tax refund both represent payments accorded to the taxpayer that can be
demanded from the government.
Further, Metric Metals was one of the first cases to address tax-related rights
in connection with security interests under Article 9.18o However, the court
reached its ultimate conclusion with respect to the tax refund in a very summary
fashion. The court's full analysis consisted of one paragraph where it
acknowledged the lack of authority on the matter but noted that the case law and
commentators leaned toward finding that tax refunds fall within the parameters
of general intangibles.182
One case relied on by the court in Metric Metals was In re Certified
Packaging, Inc.,'83 where the court stated in dicta that security for the loan did
not include rights to any tax refunds because the financing statement did not
include "general intangibles."1 84 The crux of the case dealt with whether the
security interest in accounts receivable would extend to a check from the U.S.
government, namely, the IRS, to the debtor for its tax refund.185 The court's
statement that tax refunds fell within the category of general intangibles was
made in a brief and conclusory fashion and did not form a basis for the ultimate
disposition of the case.1 86
The Metric Metals court also looked to Board of County Commissioners v.
Berkeley Villagel87 for the proposition that money a claimant expects to recover
in a lawsuit is the kind of right that would constitute a general intangible. 88 In
turn, the court in Berkeley Village buttressed its conclusion upon Pennsylvania
and Oregon 90 state court cases, finding that the right to collect money from a
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. See GARBIS ET AL., supra note 172, 17.01, at 17-2 to -3.
180. See Sterling Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int'l, Inc.), 20 B.R.
633, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
181. See id.
182. See id. (citing In re Certified Packaging, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan & Co.) 95,
102 (Bankr. D. Utah); COOGAN UNDATED, supra note 169, § 5A.09[1]); see also McDonnell, supra
note 169, 1A-31 (citing U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (2001)).
183. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan & Co.) 95 (Bankr. D. Utah 1970).
184. See id. at 102.
185. See id. at 97-98.
186. See id. at 102.
187. 580 P.2d 1251 (Colo. App. 1978).
188. See In re Metric Metals, 20 B.R. at 636 (citing Berkeley Vill., 580 P.2d at 1255).
189. See Sams v. Redevelopment Auth. of New Kensington, 261 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1970).
190. Great W. Nat'1 Bank v. Hill (In re Estate of Hill), 557 P.2d 1367 (Or. App. 1976).
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potential lawsuit is not the same as a right to collect under a judgment, but
rather, is more akin to the right to proceeds from a condemnation action.191
The foregoing authorities served as the rationale behind the Metric Metals
decision that the right to a tax refund constitutes a general intangible. 92 While
tax refunds do share many of the same qualities as tax credits, the court's
rationale is not flawless. The right to collect money from a lawsuit is markedly
different from that under a tax rebate.' 93 The right to collect from a suit depends
upon many subjective factors, such as the deliberations of the trier of fact-be it
judge or jury-as well as the arguments and law brought forward by counsel for
both sides. Whether the anticipated funds materialize from the suit depends on
numerous shifting and uncertain events. However, with a tax refund, one is able
to calculate with certainty the amount that one will receive.194 The process
merely involves determining one's gross taxable income, making the appropriate
deductions, applying the applicable marginal tax rate, and then reducing this
amount by any allowable tax credits.195 Any amounts that were withheld and
paid to the IRS in excess of the amount owed, or any amounts left in credits, if
applicable, after the reduction of tax liability to zero, result in a tax refund.196
These determinations are not left to a trier of fact, but are rather predictable and
certain.
Notwithstanding the weaknesses in the rationale used to support the
proposition that tax refunds should be deemed general intangibles, courts have
found comfort in this holding.' 97  This conclusion also seems to hold water
because of the payment nature of the right.198 The right to a tax refund involves
the principal right of a debtor to collect money from the creditor; a right derived
from a personal property right other than one in connection with goods,
accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money. 199 If such is the
case, then the right to demand a refund of cash from the government based on
excess refundable tax credits would also be deemed a general intangible.200
While a tax refund is generally the result of an overpayment of funds during the
191. See Berkeley Vill., 580 P.2d at 1255 (citing Friedman, Lobe & Block v. C.L.W. Corp.,
512 P.2d 769, 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); In re Estate of Hill, 557 P.2d at 1372; Sams, 261 A.2d at
570).
192. See In re Metric Metals, 20 BR. at 636 (citing In re Certified Packaging, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan & Co.) at 102; Berkeley Vill. 580 P.2d at 1255).
193. See supra Part ll.A (discussing the mechanics of tax credits); see also GARBIS ET AL.,
supra note 172, [ 17.01, at 17-2 to -3 (discussing the taxpayer's right to receive a tax refund under
certain circumstances).
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. See supra Part II.A.
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. See In re Metric Metals, 20 B.R. at 636; In re Certified Packaging, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) at 102; Berkeley Vill., 580 P.2d at 1255.
198. See supra Part II.B (noting that tax credits could be considered payment intangibles).
199. See supra Part II.B (noting that tax credits could be considered general intangibles); see
also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2011) (defining "general intangibles").
200. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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tax year, and a tax credit is a separate and independent disposition by the
government, both result in the payment of funds.201
The only counter to this conclusion, as discussed above, is the case of
nonrefundable credits.202 These credits are used purely to reduce tax liability,
and any excess credits that cannot be claimed must either be carried forward to
203
be used in the next year or lost altogether. Therefore, nonrefundable tax
credits do not represent a right to demand payment. If a taxpayer does not
withhold more than is necessary to fulfill his tax obligations, and if his credits
can only be used to reduce tax liability, then there is no right to demand
payment. Rather, nonrefundable tax credits reduce the amount that one has to
pay to the government, but they do not entail the right to demand payment from
the government. One could still argue, however, that this merely means that
nonrefundable credits can only fall into the broader category of general
intangibles and cannot be deemed payment intangibles, which are merely a
subset of general intangibles. 204 Although Metric Metals opened the door for tax
credits to be deemed general intangibles, the court did not arrive at this ultimate
conclusion.205 Because tax credits share similarities with, but also differences
from, tax refunds, the court left the final determination open for another day.
B. City of Chicago v. Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative
The first case to address the question of tax credit financing was City of
Chicago v. Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative.206  In Michigan Beach
Housing Cooperative, the developers of a 240-unit low-income housing facility
obtained financing through a mortgage insured by the U.S. Department of
207Housing and Urban Development (HUD). When the developers defaulted on
the loan, HUD foreclosed on the property, and the developer declared
bankruptcy.208 In an effort to obtain approval for a plan of reorganization, the
developers suggested turning the complex into a cooperative, whereby the
209
residents of the complex would manage the facility through a nonprofit entity.
In order to effectuate the new plan, the defendant-cooperative obtained a loan
from the City of Chicago (City) to be secured by the building and other assets.210
201. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
202. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 82, at 925.
203. See id; see, e.g., 1.R.C. § 25B(g) (2006) (prohibiting credits for retirement savings
exceeding the sum of the regular tax liability, plus certain other taxes, over the sum of the credits
allowable under this section and § 27).
204. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
205. See Sterling Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int'l, Inc.), 20 B.R.
633, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
206. 609 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
207. Id. at 880.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 881.
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When the defendant-cooperative's financial position looked negative, it
approached the City and HUD to receive approval of a new plan.2 11 The new
plan involved operating the building as a rental complex owned by a limited
partnership-as opposed to a cooperative-and the City and HUD granting low-
income housing tax credits to the limited partnership in order to syndicate with
additional investors.212 After the deal was agreed upon, the City and the Illinois
Housing Development Authority, as local grantors of the credits, committed a
combined $780,000in low-income housing tax credits to the developers.2 13
Shortly thereafter, the City objected to the change in ownership structure from a
cooperative to a limited partnership.214 Notwithstanding the City's objection, the
ownership change was consummated, and the new owners of the limited
partnership were the defendant, as the general partner, and National Tax Credit
Investors II, as the limited partner acting as the syndicated investor.215
Once the City learned of the transfers and syndication of funds, it filed suit
to enforce its rights under the loan and security documents.216 Among other
things, the City claimed that, under Article 9 of the Illinois Commercial Code, it
was entitled to recover from the cash proceeds of the low-income housing tax
credits because the debtors had granted an interest in the credits through the
loan's security agreement.217 Specifically, the City argued that the syndication
funds received by the limited partnership from the investors were, in essence,
"proceeds" 218 of the tax credits. 219 The security agreement described the City's
collateral, in part, as 'all . . . interests ... in and to all ... personal property of
211. Id.
212. The credits at issue in this case are Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC):
The tax credits ... derive from Congress' Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-
514). Each year, State and local agencies are granted low-income housing tax credits by
the Federal government. The local entities then award the tax credits to eligible low-
income properties. Once awarded, the low-income housing tax credits cannot be
transferred from the property to which they were awarded-if they are not used because
the property does not become a low-income residence, the Federal government reclaims
them. Once tax credits are allocated to a property, the owner can sell limited partnership
interests in the property so that investors can take advantage of the tax credits. This is
called syndication.
See id. at 881 & n.1.
213. Id at 881.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 881-82.
216. Id. at 882.
217. Id. at 882, 884.
218. The court explained the handling of proceeds from a sale of collateral as follows:
Generally, under sections 306(2) and (3) of Article 9, as long as the creditor has a
perfected security interest in the underlying collateral, he will also have a perfected
security interest in the identifiable proceeds of the sale of the collateral, even if the term
"proceeds" is absent from the security agreement or the financing statement.
Id. at 885 (citing 26 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 9/306(3) (West 1991); In re Keneco Fin. Grp.,
Inc., 131 B.R. 90, 94 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); Farns Assocs., Inc. v. S. Side Bank, 417 N.E.2d
818, 821 (111. App. Ct. 1981)).
219. Id. at 884.
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any kind or character now or hereafter owned by Borrower and ... used or
useful in connection with the Real Estate and Improvements."'220 The City
asserted that the low-income housing tax credits were general intangible personal
property used "in connection" with the building.221 Therefore, the syndication
funds would be considered "proceeds" of the tax credits and, thus, security for
the loan.222
The court rejected the City's argument, stating that the security agreement
did not cover the tax credits. 223 Aside from specifically naming the tax credits in
the description of collateral, the argument that they were "in connection with"
the real estate subject to the mortgage was "a fire too distant to give any warmth
to the [C]ity." 224 The court observed that the "in connection with" clause was
meant to be limited to only those types of personal property with a physical
connection to the building.225 While the court could have stopped at this
juncture and moved on, it continued to opine on the use of tax credits as
collateral in any Article 9 transaction.226 Specifically, the court stated, "[w]e
find the [C]ity's argument unavailing also because income tax credits cannot be
intangible personal property subject to a security interest under Article 9.,"227
The court acknowledged, as is stated many times herein, that "no court has yet
determined whether income tax credits constitute general intangibles for
purposes of Article 9,"228 However, the court looked to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Randall v. Loftsgaarden229 for instruction.230 In
Randall the Court held, for purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, that:
The tax benefits attributable to ownership of a security initially take
the form of tax deductions or tax credits. These have no value in
themselves; the economic benefit to the investor-the true "tax
benefit"-arises because the investor may offset tax deductions against
income received from other sources or use tax credits to reduce the taxes
otherwise payable on account of such income. Unlike payments in cash
or property received by virtue of ownership of a security-such as
distributions or dividends on stock, interest on bonds, or a limited
partner's distributive share of the partnership's capital gains or profits-
the "receipt" of tax deductions or credits is not itself a taxable event, for
220. Id. at 885.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id
224. Id
225. Id
226. See id.
227. Id
228. Id
229. 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
230. See Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 885.
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the investor has received no money or other "income" within the
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. 231
In developing its arguments, the City pointed to the various cases affirming
the analysis in Metric Metals, which held that tax refunds can be used as
collateral, in order to further the argument that tax credits could also be used as
security.232 Nevertheless, the Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative court
rejected the City's arguments, noting that income tax refunds are "vastly
different" than tax credits.233
Income tax refunds are quite obviously a property right because
they constitute a present or future right to receive money which can be
freely transferred after receipt. . . . [however], unlike income tax
refunds, tax credits do not constitute a right to a payment of money,
have no independent value, and are not freely transferable upon
receipt.234
The court in Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative made several broad
statements regarding tax credits that are in need of closer review and
refinement.235 First, the court used Randall-a case that dealt with tax credits
and deductions in the context of federal securities law 236-as an analytical
guidepost. 23 7 Arguably, the narrowness of this field, as well as the particular
facts of Randall, should caution one from extrapolating broad principles of law
from specific scenarios involving the tax benefits derived from ownership in
stocks, bonds, and other securities. 238 Secondly, the court stated that tax credits
231. Randall, 478 U.S. at 656-57.
232. See Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 886.
233. Id. (citing Randall, 478 U.S. at 656-57).
234. Id
235. See id. at 885-86.
236. Randall, 478 U.S. at 650.
237. See Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 885-86 (citing Randall, 478 U.S. at 656-
57, 666-67).
238. See Randall, 478 U.S. at 650-55. The court in Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative
acknowledged that Randall was decided as a securities case, but the court pointed to other cases that
have upheld the Randall analysis of income tax credits in other scenarios as well. 609 N.E.2d at
886 (citing Bove v. Worlco Data Sys., Inc., No. 86-1419, 1987 WL 5715, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21,
1987) (recognizing that "the Court's analysis in Randall extends to 'out-of pocket' damages outside
the context of the securities laws"); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. WH Venture, No. 84-5673, 1987 WL
11946, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1987) ("Although Randall was decided in the context of the federal
securities laws, its analysis of the nature of tax benefits is equally applicable in other contexts.")).
The distinction the court does not make, however, is that the Bove and WH Venture courts used the
Randall analysis when reviewing whether damages in a litigation suit should be reduced due to tax
benefits that were received in connection with a limited partnership interest. See Bove, 1987 WL
5715, at *1; WH Venture, 1987 WL 11946, at *1-2. The particular facts at play do not bear upon
whether a valid security interest can be created in tax credits. While it may seem obvious that no
creditor would take a security interest in valueless property, it is not for the court to decide whether
2012] 167
25
Odinet: Testing the Reach of UCC Article 9: The Question of Tax Credit Co
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and deductions "have no value in themselves" because the benefit derived from
these rights requires that there first be income and a resulting tax liability.239
The court compared these tax rights to distributions and dividends from the
ownership of certain securities, which, in and of themselves, constitute
independent economic value.240 However, the court neglected to realize that tax
credits can, and do, have independent value.241 Credits that are nonrefundable
may require income in order to be useable, but this requirement does not render
them worthless to an investor.242 Simply because there is a requirement of tax
liability-a requirement which most all persons and entities would fulfill to
some extent-does not mean that the credits have no value.243 There is no
requirement in Article 9 that collateral have a certain level of value in order to be
legally used as security for an obligation.244 Rather, the type of property must
merely have some value and fit within the collateral categories provided in the
code. To superimpose an additional requirement of some roving, undefined
level of value would be to add to the law in a way that neither the drafters of
Article 9 nor the state legislatures that have adopted it envisioned. Moreover,
refundable tax credits do have independent economic value under Michigan
Beach Housing Cooperative's test because they can produce a refund.246 In this
regard, tax credits are no different than a tax refund, which the court
acknowledged as valid collateral for purposes of Article 9.247 Tax credits
constitute a right to demand payment because, once earned, they produce a
payment from the government that can be enforced by the individual to whom
the credits are entitled.248
Also, the court in Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative stated that
[t]he investors cannot transfer or sell the tax credits separate from the
security [in the entity] itself. ... The tax credits they received along
with their interest in the partnership were incidental benefits of that
investment-not separate intangible personal property which could
the "value" in a given piece of personal property rises to the level of sufficiency such that it would
be acceptable to a lender. Such determinations are business decisions and are better left to the
parties to decide. The only body of law that need be at play in questions of security over personal
property is that of Article 9 and its related case law.
239. Randall, 478 U.S. at 656-57.
240. See id. at 657.
241. See supra Part II.A.
242. See supra Part II.A.
243. See supra Part II.A.
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. See supra Part II.A.
246. See City of Chi. v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d 877, 886 (tl. App. Ct. 1993).
247. See, e.g., Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int'l, Inc.),
20 B.R. 633, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a "debtor had property rights in the claims
for tax refunds").
248. See supra Part II.A.
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collateralize the city's loan-and whatever benefit they conferred on the
investor renders no comfort to the city.249
While the court is correct in stating that these particular federal low-income
housing tax credits are not transferable-as the investor must actually have an
equity interest in the entity that eams the credits and then have the credits
allocated to the investor through the entity-that is not to say that all tax credits
are treated this way.2o Tax credits vary and their assignability and
transferability differ depending on the statutory and regulatory provisions
governing the tax credit program.251 Some credits can be claimed only by the
individual who earns them, while some can be transferred to an investor through
an equity allocation, provided the investor is an equity owner in the entity that
252earns the credits2. Further still, some credits are certificated and can be freely
253transferred, just as one buys and sells other assets. The exact nature of how
the credits can flow and be transferred is not uniform throughout the Internal
254Revenue Code or between state and federal schemes. Rather, each credit has
its own parameters, particulars, and rules that help effectuate the underlying
government policy at play.255 The court in Michigan Beach Housing
Cooperative made broad statements regarding the sale and transfer of credits
which-although perhaps applicable to the federal low-income housing tax
256credit-are not applicable to all credits across the board. Further, making
such global statements regarding the lack of value of tax credits, regardless of
their refundability or assignability, serves as a poor roadmap for future courts to
deal with an area of the law that is unchartered and complex. Unfortunately, in a
regime where each tax credit is governed by its own particular set of rules, and
can vary greatly between federal and state counterparts, the court in Michigan
Beach Housing Cooperative was too aggressive in laying down blanket rules and
broad policy statements to provide a useful and accurate groundwork on which
future courts could rely when dealing with security interests in tax credit
257transactions.
249. See Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 886.
250. See id.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. See supra Part fl.A.
253. See Jeffrey D. Gaulin, Allocated and Certificated Credits: What Matters When
Combining State Tax Credits and NMTCs, NOVOGRADAC NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT REPORT
(Novogradac & Co., S.F., Cal.), Mar. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.novoco.cominew_
markets/resource files/articlemonth/nmtc articleofmonth 0308.pdf.
254. See generally MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41641, REDUCING THE
BUDGET DEFICIT: TAX POLICY OPTIONs 13 (2011), available at http://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/crs-
analyzes-tax-policy-options (discussing the characteristics of various tax credits in an analysis of
various revenue options for deficit reduction).
255. See id.
256. See Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 886.
257. See id.
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C. In re Richardson
A more recent case addressing tax credit financing originated in an Ohio
bankruptcy court.258 In the case of In re Richardson, the petitioner took out three
loans from a bank in anticipation of a future tax refund that she would receive at
the end of the year.259 As part of the loan application, the bank's tax agent
assisted the petitioner in the preparation of her tax return and filed it
electronically with the IRS. 26 0 Additionally, the petitioner was required to sign a
loan agreement which provided that, among other things, the bank would receive
"'a security interest in and to my tax refund, my account at the Credit Union into
which my tax refund will be deposited, any other accounts at the Credit Union I
may have, and any amounts that are deposited into such accounts from time to
time."' 2 6 1 Under the terms of the loan, the IRS would deposit the petitioner's
refund directly into a designated account at the bank, and the bank would then
262apply the funds toward the repayment of the loan. However, the IRS
erroneously deposited the funds directly into the petitioner's account at the bank
263instead. Upon receiving the refund, petitioner realized that the bank's tax
agent who prepared her return failed to claim the "earned income tax credit" to
264which the petitioner was entitled. Petitioner then returned to the bank and
requested additional funds be advanced in an amount equal to the refund she
would have received if the earned income tax credit would have been
265included. The bank, which typically did not make loans in connection with
the earned income tax credit, agreed to advance the funds at a lesser amount,
266
provided the petitioner enter into additional loan agreements. Prior to the
petitioner's receipt of the long-awaited refund from the tax credits, she sought
267
protection under Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code. Upon receipt of the
258. See In re Richardson, 216 B.R. 206 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
259. See id. at 208-09. The court noted at the outset:
Here, we examine the largely unregulated practice by financial institutions of lending
funds to taxpayers based upon their anticipated income tax refund. While not expressly
condoned by the federal government, the practice as far as bankruptcy courts are
concerned appears to be growing more popular with debtors who find themselves having
to seek the protection under the bankruptcy laws. Too often, already strapped debtors
view these programs as a quick answer to their immediate cash problems without the
benefit of a long term strategy for addressing the problems at their roots. These debtors
very often find themselves worse off than when they started. This case is no exception.
Id. at 209.
260. Id. at 209.
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 210.
264. Id
265. Id
266. Id.
267. Id at 211.
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refund, petitioner turned the funds over to her attorney instead of forwarding
them to the bank.268
Among other theories, the bank claimed that it had been granted a security
interest in the earned income tax credit.269 However, the petitioner argued that
the bank needed to have actual possession of the tax proceeds in order to
270establish that the security interest had been perfected under state law.
Nevertheless, the bank argued that regardless of whether the interest was
perfected, it was still effective between the parties and thus could be enforced
271against the petitioner who still held the funds. In its analysis, the court
characterized the collateral as "the right to receive the proceeds from a check the
Debtor received from the IRS representing an earned income tax credit." 272 The
court went on to state that this particular type of security right was analogous to
a right to receive a check representing a refund of excess state
unemployment taxes [representing] "a kind of property known in the
law as a chose in action or a thing in action."
Furthermore, a property right known in the law as a "chose in
action" or "thing in action" falls under the definition of "general
intangible."273
After identifying the rights in the earned income tax credit as a general
intangible, which could be secured under Article 9, the court went on to analyze
whether such a security right had indeed been created.274 Interestingly, the court
held that the language in the loan agreement that granted a security interest "in
and to my tax refund" was sufficient to encapsulate rights to the tax credit
275proceeds as well2. Because, in this case, the refund from the tax credit was
transmitted to the petitioner through her annual tax refund, the security rights in
the broader category of the entire refund necessarily captured any refund benefits
276derived from the tax credits. The court concluded that the security was
effective between the parties, but since no financing statement had been filed, it
277was not effective against third parties. Since there were no other secured
creditors attempting to establish priority over the collateral, the court resolved
that the bank had the right to enforce its security rights over the proceeds from
the tax credits, which came in the form of the refund.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 219.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 219 (quoting In re Gross-Feibel Co., 21 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 219-20.
278. Id at 220.
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While the court in Richardson held that tax credits were valid as collateral
for financing purposes, its analysis did little to help clarify the framework in
which these types of collateral operate. 27 9 First, if.tax credits are susceptible to
collateralization, they most likely fall under the category of general intangibles
under Article 9.280 In order to grant an interest in general intangibles, the debtor
must describe the collateral as such within the security agreement.281 However,
in Richardson the debtor granted a security interest solely in the tax refund.282
As stated before, the proceeds from a tax refund amount to a repayment of funds
that have been withheld or paid by the taxpayer over the course of the taxable
year in excess of what was truly owed.283 Further, tax credits that are refundable
and that cannot be used to reduce the taxpayer's liability any further-for
example, when an individual's total tax liability has been extinguished-also
come back to the taxpayer in the form of a payment as part of the annual tax
refund.284 Thus, the amount that is refunded comes both from excess payments
or. withholdings beyond that which is owed by the individual and, if applicable,
any refundable tax credits which cannot be used to reduce the overall liability.2 85
It is incorrect to presume that an interest in a tax refund will always produce, as a
part of such refund, a payment related to tax credits claimed by the individual.286
Many tax credits can be used only to reduce tax liability, and if there are excess
credits after the liability has been reduced to nothing, they must be carried
forward for use in the next tax year.287
The analysis in Richardson suggests that every time a security interest is
granted in a tax refund it also necessarily grants a security interest in any credits
288claimed. But the result in Richardson is not inconsistent because, under those
facts, the tax credit was refundable and was coming to the taxpayer in the form
of a payment.289 Therefore, it was not difficult for the court to find that the
290
credit proceeds were subject to the security interest in favor of the bank.
However, if the tax credit was not refundable, but rather, was one which must be
carried forward for use in another taxable year, then it would be more difficult to
say that the loan agreement's statements about granting a security interest "in
and to my tax refund" also contemplated a security interest in any applicable tax
credits.291 The court's limited analysis glossed over the necessary steps to
279. See id. at 219.
280. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 171.
281. See id.; U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2011).
282. See In re Richardson, 216 B.R. at 209.
283. See supra Part II.A.
284. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 82, at 925.
285. See id.
286. See supra Part II.A.
287. See supra Part II.A.
288. See In re Richardson, 216 B.R. 206,219 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
289. Id.
290. See id. at 219-20.
29 1. See id.
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connect the language in the agreement granting the security to the ultimate
holding of the case.2 By drawing lines between the interest-granting provisions
in the tax refund and the conclusion that the interest included the general
intangible earned income tax credit, the court failed to recognize the proper
method of attaching a security interest under Article 9 and further helped
obfuscate the ultimate issue. 293
Moreover, a security interest under Article 9-although it need not involve
the specificity that is required when granting a mortgage over real property-
calls for a description of the collateral. Typically, the collateral is described in
terms of the general categories laid out in Article 9, such as all accounts, all
inventory, or all general intangibles.295 Sometimes, however, debtors will name
specific types of collateral, like a specific deposit account, instead of saying "all
deposit accounts."296 In Richardson, the security agreement did not state "all
general intangibles"-which arguably would have been an unequivocal grant of
a security interest in any tax credits-but instead named a specific type of
general intangible-the rights in and to the tax refund.297  The court, in its
conclusory analysis, held that this amounted to the granting of a security interest
in the tax credits as well, without specifically setting forth how this conclusion
was reached.298 The implication of this broad rationale is to conclude that every
security interest in a tax refund would also include a security interest in and to
any tax credits that the taxpayer may be entitled. Under the holding in
Richardson, borrowers are left to ponder exactly what collateral they grant when
security is pledged in the form of a tax refund.299  Without more careful
discussion and analysis, the question of tax credit financing remains open-ended,
if not further muddied.
IV. SUGGESTING A NEW TEST FOR ASSESSING TAX CREDIT COLLATERAL
As courts have struggled with the issue of how to treat tax credits when used
as collateral, the analytical framework at play in supporting each holding leaves
much to guesswork. Courts have drawn parallels to other types of rights in
order to make assessments about tax credit collateral, oftentimes in ways that
292. See id. at 219.
293. See id.; U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2011).
294. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
295. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 25.
296. See id.
297. See In re Richardson, 216 B.R. at 219.
298. See id. at 219-20.
299. See id
300. See, e.g., id; Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bornstein (In re Metric Metals Int'l,
Inc.), 20 B.R. 633, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); City of Chi. v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609
N.E.2d 877 (111. App. Ct. 1993); see also Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001, LP v. Comm'r, 639
F.3d 129, 141-42 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing that, although tax credits were not transferrable, they
maintained inherent value as property).
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seem inconsistent with the very nature of tax credits. 30 1 Alternatively, some
interpretations comport with the nature of tax credits but not necessarily with the
302nature of the rights to which credits are being compared. Moreover, the courts
have made broad and sweeping pronouncements about the nature of Article 9
collateral in general, at times even suggesting that additional requirements-
outside those articulated in the statute-are required in order to properly perfect
the security right.30 3 Lastly, courts have taken one or more nuanced aspects of a
specific tax credit and extrapolated them over the broad field of all tax credits
without carefully considering the maxim that not all credits are created equal.304
Without a more coherent framework to work within, courts will continue to
struggle and produce varying, inconsistent holdings in tax credit secured
transaction cases.
A. Adjusting the Focus
Despite these varying analytical fine points which have contributed, in no
small part, to the overall thicket of conflicting case law, the one element that all
of the cases have in common is that the courts tend to focus, even if only by
implication, on the refundability of tax credits.305 For instance, in Michigan
Beach Housing Cooperative the court held that tax credits have no economic
value because there first must be a tax liability in order for the credits to be of
use.306 In this case, the court was confronted with Low-Income Housing Tax
307Credits, which are not refundable and can be used only to reduce liability.
Here, the court was focusing on the specific payment nature of the credit.
However, the specific tax credit at issue could not be used to generate a refund,
but rather, could be used only to reduce the taxpayer's liability; therefore, the
court held that the credit could not be used as collateral.309 Setting aside the fact
that the Low-Income Housing Tax Credits in this case were nonrefundable, not
all credits are such, and the court's analysis hinged on the refundability
310
question. The focus was on whether this credit could, in essence, ever be used
to produce a cash payment.311 Further, in Richardson the court suggested that
because the earned income credit produced a cash refund, and because that cash
refund would come to the taxpayer in the form of her annual tax refund, the bank
301. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 279-99 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part 11.
306. City of Chi. v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d 877, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
307. See id. at 881 & n.1.
308. See id. at 886.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. Id
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312had obtained an interest in the tax credits themselves. However, the debtor
did not grant an interest in general intangibles in the security agreement but
rather only in the tax refund. 13 The court's holding suggests that, because the
tax credit came in the form of a refund and the security interest was granted in
the refund, a security interest was effectively in the tax credits.314 However, if
the tax credit at issue represented a nonrefundable right, would the court's
holding be the same? The court made no specific distinction as to whether a
different type of credit would produce a different result.315 But again, as in
Michigan Beach Housing Cooperative, the court focused-albeit perhaps
316subconsciously-on the refundability question. Whether the credit was
refundable determined the court's analysis or, at the very least, guided the court
to its ultimate conclusion. 317
A key issue at play in producing the varying results from the courts that have
faced the tax credit issue is precisely this misplaced focus on refundability. By
focusing on refundability, courts are presupposing that only those tax credits that
produce a refund actually have enough value to be eligible for
collateralization. 3 1  In essence, unless a particular credit can be turned to cash, it
cannot be used as collateral.319 Further, this conclusion seems to rest on the
supposition that a credit must take an interest in its collateral in a certain
threshold amount.320 As stated above, Article 9 does not require a particular
level of value for collateral to be eligible as security; rather, the property must
simply have some value. 3 2 1 These value decisions are-as they should be-left
322to the parties to the transaction. The parties are in the best position to
determine whether the debtor's offering is of enough significance to the creditor
to entice him to advance funds.323 Courts should not look further into the minds
of the parties when attempting to ameliorate any of the creditor's risk
miscalculations. 324 All Article 9 requires is some level of value and compliance
312. See In re Richardson, 216 B.R. 206, 219 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id.; City of Chi. v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d 877, 886 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
317. See supra Part I.B.
318. See supra Part III.
319. See, e.g., Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d at 886 (concluding that tax credits have
no independent value, and therefore cannot serve as collateral).
320. See id at 884-86.
321. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 197 (6th ed. 2009) ("Article 9 places no express limits on what may serve as
collateral.").
322. See id. at 150-52, 197.
323. See Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 3.1.2, at 59-60 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 27th ed. 2007).
324. See generally David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract (George Mason Univ. Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 08-51, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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with the procedural aspects of the statute in order to perfect a security interest in
personal property.325 Therefore, the imposition of an additional value
requirement would seem to be purely judicial, thereby developing only through a
succession of cases addressing the issue of value. This imposition would create
uncertainty in the market and could result in many creditors requiring more
collateral than would traditionally be necessary based on fear that a court may
find their value determination to be invalid because of a failure to meet some
invisible value threshold.326
Further, the other essential pillar to the refundability focus is the supposition
that nonrefundable tax credits have no value.327 Because credits are merely
statutorily relegated to the pure reduction of tax liability, it would seem, based
on the cases above, that tax credits are disqualified from collateralization. 328In
fact, many credits are nonrefundable and, despite this aspect, are readily traded,
bought, and sold on the open market.3 29 An individual with a high tax liability
would find no less value in a credit used to reduce the amount of money he is
forced to pay to the government than a credit that could be converted to cash if
his liability was zeroed out. The value is the same in either case because the
credit is conveying certain economic benefits-be it the reduction of tax liability
or the payment of a refund-to the taxpayer. 330  It is not necessary for the
taxpayer to receive a refund in order for credits to be valuable.331 If that were the
case, then all tax credits would be refundable, and that is certainly not the
case.332 Further, even refundable tax credits will produce only a refund if that
taxpayer's liability has been reduced to zero.333 In many cases, tax credits are
used to reduce a taxpayer's liability-not completely wipe it out-but the easing
id=1239749 (surveying United States Supreme Court cases on the liberty of contract doctrine).
But see Zvika Neeman, The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 685, 686, 699 (1999) (arguing that the freedom to voluntarily contract should be restrained in
certain transactions).
325. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-203 (2011) (setting forth requirements for attachment and
enforceability of security interests); id § 9-309 (security interests, such as payment intangibles,
attached and perfected immediately upon sale); id. § 9-312 (security interests in chattel paper and
deposit accounts perfected by filing or control); id. § 9-313 (perfection by possession).
326. See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
327. See City of Chi. v. Mich. Beach Hous. Coop., 609 N.E.2d 877, 886 (ll. App. Ct. 1993).
328. See id.
329. See Michael J. Novogradac, Investing in Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENTS, U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/
static/community-affairs/community-developmentsinvestments/spring06/investinginlowincome.htm
(Mar. 2010); see also Why Invest in Tax Credits?, AFFORDABLE EQUITY PARTNERS, INC. (Mar. 24,
2012), http://aepartners.com/whyinvest.aspx (arguing that tax credits are safe investments that can
generate high returns); David Weaver & Jeff Cornwall, Should Angel Investors Get Tax Credits to
Invest in Small Businesses?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2012, at R5 (providing contrasting views on
whether investors should receive tax credits for investing in small businesses).
330. See GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 56, at 879-83.
331. Id.
332. See Batchelder et al., supra note 15, at 25.
333. See id. at33.
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of the overall liability is valuable to the taxpayer nonetheless. 334 Would courts
then suggest that only those taxpayers who have tax credits that can effectively
both zero out their tax liability and leave enough left over to produce a refund
pledge their credits as collateral? Such a litmus test for tax credit collateral
certainly departs from the economic realities of how tax credits operate in the
marketplace 3s and surely goes far beyond what the drafters of Article 9
envisioned when they created the general intangibles category. 3 36
The focus on refundability is flawed because it creates assumptions
regarding the value and variability of tax credits that departs from the economic
realities of the transaction, and it adds a requirement for creating a security
interest under Article 9 that should not exist. n Courts should recognize this
focus on refundability and jettison it for a more accurate and appropriate
approach in analyzing tax credit collateral; specifically, an approach that focuses
on transferability.
B. A Two-Pronged Approach to Transferability
Courts should focus on the transferability characteristics of tax credits-the
aspect that is most important in terms of providing security. If the credit can be
effectively transferred to a third party, then the credit can be seized in the event
of a default, and a forced sale can ensue.338 However, if the transfer of the credit
is limited to the taxpayer only, then the ability to assign the rights in the credit as
collateral for an obligation is impermissible. In essence, a creditor who would
take a security right in a nontransferable credit would, for all practical purposes,
have a useless security interest because the creditor would be without an avenue
to actually possess the credit.340  Transferability-not refundability-is what
matters most in assessing the viability of the security. This transferability
inquiry involves the intersection of Article 9 and the laws and regulations
applicable to the tax credit in question. This examination can be further broken
down into its more theoretical and practical aspects. In order to make a full
334. See GUERIN & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 56, at 879-83.
335. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
337. See generally Part Ill.A and accompanying discussion.
338. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 321, at 38-40.
An enforceable right to possession also has strategic value. The creditor who can make a
credible threat to dispossess the debtor-even if only temporarily-has extraordinary
leverage over the debtor....
This kind of leverage can flow in the other direction as well. The debtor who can
credibly threaten to retain possession of the collateral for a long time, to run up the cost
of repossession, or to reduce the value of the collateral before the creditor can gain
possession may be able to take advantage of the creditor in post-default negotiations.
Id
339. See id
340. See id. ("The ability to gain or retain possession during foreclosure can have a value far
in excess of the use value of the property during the period in question.").
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assessment of transferability, a two-pronged approach is suggested-one that
looks to both the substantive and procedural nature of the granting of the security
interest.
First, does the collateralized tax credit meet the substantive transferability
prong? In other words, does the statute creating the tax credit, and the
accompanying tax rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, allow for the
tax credit to be transferred? As stated before, some tax credits may only be
claimed by the person entitled to them and cannot be transferred. 341 This may be
for public policy reasons, such as with certain credits that are enacted in order to
provide economic relief to the poor or those who have suffered from a crisis or
natural disaster.342 In this case, public policy dictates that, because the credit is
aimed at a specific population or demographic, it should not be transferable so as
to create value for unintended parties.34 However, also stated above, many
credits are transferable because government policy desires that they be traded,
exchanged, bought, and sold on the open market in order to further enhance and
develop the particular activity the government wishes to encourage.344 In
analyzing this first prong, courts must look beyond the mere requirements of
Article 9 and delve into the substance of the tax credit itself. This calls for a
more intensive analysis; one that courts of general jurisdiction are often times
uncomfortable making in light of the specialized nature of tax law.345
Nevertheless, the nuances of tax credits in the collateral context require a
crossing-over of disciplines in order to conduct a full and coherent analysis.
Determining whether the credit has the legal properties that allow for transfers to
341. See generally John J. Infranca, Note, The Earned Income Tax Credit as an Incentive to
Report: Engaging the Informal Economy Through Tax Policy, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 203, 204 (2008)
(discussing the Earned Income Tax Credit and tax and transfer program reporting policies); V.
Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit 1-15 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8078, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8078
(discussing the history and evolution of the Earned Income Tax Credit).
342. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 983, 986 (2000)
(discussing the political history and policies behind the Earned Income Tax Credit and its
precursors); Dorothy A. Brown et al., The Undeserving Poor?: Welfare, Tax Policy, and Political
Discourse (Wash. & Lee Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-
02, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=530223 (comparing the
Earned Income Tax Credit to welfare).
343. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., William J. Luther, Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for
Lackluster Policy, TAX FOUND. SPECIAL REPORT (Tax Found., Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2010, at 1, 2-5,
16, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1538687 ("In the last decade,
state governments have 'gone Hollywood,' or tried to, by enacting dozens of movie production
incentives (MPLs), including tax credits for film production."). See generally Michael S. Knoll,
Taxes and Competitiveness 6, 16 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
06-28, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=953074 (discussing
how tax incentives affect competitiveness).
345. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 826-31 (1991).
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third parties is the first and most foundational question in determining whether it
can be effectively collateralized.
Second, does the collateralized tax credit meet the procedural transferability
prong? Stated another way, have the creditor and the debtor engaged in those
activities, made those arrangements, and procured those necessary approvals so
as to mechanically allow for the tax credits, in the event of a default, to be seized
and sold by the creditor in order to obtain relief? While a scenario may pass the
substantive prong, the procedural prong is equally important because it asks the
practical question of whether the parties have engaged in the correct activity so
as to make the first prong effective. The answer to this question similarly
requires a case-by-case inquiry into the tax credit. For instance, some tax credits
are certificated-when the taxpayer receives the credit, it comes in the form of a
certificate or other tangible document which evidences the right to claim the
credit.346 If the credit is granted as collateral, the certificate might need an
addendum or a notation evidencing the fact that it is being used as collateral. 347
Typically the regulating agency will need to be notified as well as give approval
to the third party-the creditor-who is taking an interest in the credit. This is
important because, in the event there is a default and the creditor seizes the
certificates, the creditor will want to ensure that the governmental body will
respect the transfer of ownership of the security rights, even though the
government itself was not involved in approving the granting of those rights.348
In such a case, perhaps the governmental agency would become an intervening
party in the security agreement to show its intent to recognize the creditor's right
in the event of a seizure. 349 However, some credits, even though they can be
substantively transferred, cannot be procedurally transferred for use as collateral.
Specifically, many tax credits can be transferred only through an allocation to
the members of the taxpayer.3 50 For instance, New Market Tax Credits and
346. See Gaulin, supra note 253, at I ("Certificated tax credits, on the other hand, are sold to
investors like a piece of property. The state provides a certificate indicating a tax credit amount and
this certificate is transferable to (almost) anyone. This means that the investor need not be a partner
of the entity generating the credit.").
347. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2011) (requiring the security agreement to identify collateral).
348. See id. § 9-309 cmt. 4 (reflecting the policy that "[a]ny person who regularly takes
assignments of any debtor's accounts or payment intangibles should file" a financing statement or
security agreement describing the collateral).
349. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-310, -312, -313, -322, -325, & -330 (providing general rules on
perfection and priorities of secured interests).
350. See Gaulin, supra note 253, at 1. As noted by Jeffrey Gaulin:
Allocated tax credits (a category that includes all federal tax credit programs) are
allocated to the owners of a pass-through entity, such as a partnership or limited liability
company treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Therefore, to obtain an
allocated tax credit, the investor must be a partner in the entity that is generating the tax
credit. Most states that have allocated tax credits also allow for a "special allocation" of
these tax credits. A special allocation enables the investor to receive a disproportionate
amount of state tax credits compared to the partner's ownership percentage in the entity.
Id
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Low-Income Housing Tax Credits can be allocated only in this manner.351
When the tax credits are awarded to the taxpayer entity, those credits can be
passed through to all or just select members of the entity. 35 2 Although the credits
are being transferred in a sense, they are not being transferred as freely as credits
that are certificated.353  Rather, they are being passed along through the
ownership structure of the entity; for example, from a limited liability company
to its members or from a partnership to its partners.354 Not just any third party
can receive the credits; that party must have an equity interest in the entity that is
entitled to the credits, and the transfer must come through the allocation of tax
benefits to the members.3, 5 In such a case, the credits are substantively
transferable, but there would be no way to procedurally allow the credits to be
seized by a creditor in the event of a default. 3 56 There would be no way for the
seizure to take place because the tax law governing the credits would not allow
for it.3 5 7 This is where Article 9, which can be completely adhered to in the
granting of the security interest in the credits, conflicts with the tax law
governing the credits, which does not allow for the practical collateralization of
the credits.
The satisfaction of each prong is essential to granting an effective security
interest in a tax credit. By adopting this two-pronged approach to transferability,
courts will be able' to sift through the many questions and considerations
involved in the collateralization of tax credits, while still maintaining the
integrity of the Article 9 regime. This test provides a guidepost for courts, which
generally do not deal with tax issues on a regular basis,358 to use in conducting a
full and complete analysis of the issue. Aside from the typical Article 9
perfection and attachment inquiry, 3 59 this extra analysis in assessing the proper
collateralization of tax credits resolves the inter-legal issues of tax law and
Article 9-issues which reach a critical intersection when dealing with tax credit
financing.
351. See id. at 1-3.
352. Id. at 3.
353. Id
354. Id.
355. See id.
356. See generally id. at 1-3 (discussing transferability restrictions associated with allocated
tax credits).
357. Id.
358. See generally HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 1, 23 (1979) (theorizing that the United States Tax Court was formed to address the
inadequacy ofjudicial dispositions on tax issues).
359. See generally LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 105, § 2.01, at 67 (discussing attachment of
security interests), § 4.01, at 112 (discussing perfection of security interests); LOPUCKI & WARREN,
supra note 321, at 131-39 (providing general information regarding the creation and perfection of
security interests).
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V. CONCLUSION
As commercial policy changes in order to accommodate increasingly
complex business transactions, the law governing these transactions must stay
attuned to these desires. 360 This is particularly true with regard to security rights,
361which comprise such a substantial portion of commercial transactions today.
As tax credits become more and more a part of our commercial policy and, in
turn, a part of our business transactions, the law must be designed to effectively
deal with situations where these types of taxation rights are used as collateral.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was designed to give stability to the
law of security rights in personal property.362 However, the types of collateral
that parties once used in business transactions are having to make room for new
and nontraditional types of personal property rights.363 Tax credit financing is
becoming a major part of many transactions; yet the law governing the
364collateralization of these credits is uncertain. Courts that have been forced to
confront the issue have come to varying, and often inconsistent, conclusions. 365
The result has been the compilation of an unpredictable, and in some cases
incorrect, body of precedent that creates more confusion than it does stability.366
A core fault in the courts' analysis of tax credit financing is their focus on
the refundability aspect of tax credits.367 By honing in on whether the credits
can in fact produce a refund-as opposed to merely reducing tax liability-
courts have hindered their examination of the law by missing the larger and more
relevant question of transferability. Credits have value regardless of whether
they can produce a refund.368 The ability of a credit to reduce one's tax liability
360. See generally Christopher K. Odinet, Comment, Laying to Rest an Ancien Rdgime:
Antiquated Institutions in Louisiana Civil Law and Their Incompatibility with Modern Public
Policies, 70 LA. L. REv. 1367, 1368 (2010) (arguing legislatures should adapt existing laws to
account for changes in the modem business landscape).
361. See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Unification of the Law Governing Secured
Transactions: Progress and Prospects for Reform, 8 UNIFoRM L. REv. 321, 322 (2003) (discussing
various national laws related to secured transactions, and the need to develop a globalized body of
securities law); Mark J. Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transactions, and the Promise of Islamic Law, 40
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1301, 1304 (2007) (discussing the need to reform Iraqi secured
transactions law); Roderick J. Wood, Journey to the Outer Limits of Secured Transactions Law:
Caisse Populaire Desjardins De L'Est De Drummond, 48 CAN. Bus. L.J. 482, 482 (2009)
(analyzing a 2009 Canadian case dealing with security interests); Alejandro Alvarez de la Campa,
Increasing Access to Credit Through Reforming Secured Transactions in the MENA Region (The
World Bank, Working Paper No. 5613, 2011) (analyzing secured transactions law in the Middle
East and North Africa, and subsequently discussing the need for reform).
362. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 10.
363. See supra Part I.
364. See supra Part II.B.
365. See supra Part III.
366. See supra Part Ill.
367. See supra Part II.B-III.
368. See supra Part II.
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carries great value.369 It is the ability to transfer the credit which matters because
it is this aspect that governs whether, in practical terms, the creditor will have the
ability to seize the tax credit in the event -of a default. 3 70 Further, the analysis of
the transferability aspect of tax credits should be further broken down into its
substantive and procedural aspects. Specifically, courts should-in addition
to employing the traditional Article 9 inquiries-ask whether the law governing
the tax credit allows for it to be transferred to parties other than the taxpayer, and
then ask whether the parties can, and have, engaged in the type of procedures
and activities that would actually allow the creditor to seize and exercise control
over the credit in order to monetize it in the event of a default.372 By
undertaking such an analysis that cuts to the heart of whether tax credits truly
can be collateralized, courts will have a reasoned and appropriately inter-legal
framework to help them in making clear and consistent decisions and private
parties will have a roadmap in structuring their commercial transactions.
As commercial transactions become increasingly intertwined with the
granting of security rights in tax credits, it is necessary to understand and assess
the viability of collateralizing other forms of general intangibles as well. Tax
credits and other forms of nontraditional collateral were arguably envisioned by
the drafters of Article 9, evidenced by their broad definitions of general
intangibles.374 However, because this category is so expansive, it lacks some of
the reliable, intricate, and precise legal rules that many of the other collateral
categories, such as deposit accounts and investment property, enjoy in Article
9.375 Further analysis is required in order to determine whether the two-prong
test for transferability suggested in this Article could be used to aid courts and
private parties in their future understanding of business transactions that involve
the collateralization of these and other nontraditional forms of property.
369. See supra Part 11.
370. See supra Part Ill.
371. See supra Part IIl.
372. See supra Part III.
373. See supra Part 111.
374. See WARREN & WALT, supra note 1, at 171.
375. See id. at 12-13.
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